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Abstract
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be
reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving
such games with qualitative objectives for agents, such as reaching a target set, is well understood
resulting in tools with applications in robotics. In this paper, we introduce quantitative concurrent
graph games, where transitions have separate costs for different agents, and each agent attempts to
reach its target set while minimizing its own cost along the path. In this model, a solution to the
game corresponds to a set of strategies, one per agent, that forms a Nash equilibrium. We study
the problem of computing the set of all Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria, and give a comprehensive
analysis of its complexity and related problems such as the price of stability and the price of anarchy.
In particular, while checking the existence of a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete in general, with
multiple parameters contributing to the computational hardness separately, two-player games with
bounded costs on individual transitions admit a polynomial-time solution.
1 Introduction
The proliferation of massive online protocols such as auctions (Google Auctions, eBay), decentralized
crypto- currencies (Bitcoins), ride-sharing applications (Uber, Lyft), have propelled an interest in the
automated design of provably correct multi-agent systems. Synthesis, pioneered by Church’s Problem [8],
is a declarative paradigm for the automated design of provably correct systems. Synthesis is the auto-
mated construction of systems from their specifications. In the context of multi-agent system, synthesis
constructs a controller that directs agent interactions in order to satisfy the specification. Among oth-
ers, the synthesis of controllers finds vast application in motion planning in single- and multiple- robot
systems [3, 13, 15, 16, 22].
A specification for the synthesis of controller for a multi-agent systems consists two parts: First, a
description of individual agent objectives; Second, a description how agents interact with each other.
Individual agent objectives are expressed in linear temporal logic over finite domain [12] as a de-facto in
planning, or over infinite domain [20] for liveness and safety properties, and the like. Agent interactions
are expressed by graph games in which vertices and edges of a graph denote game states and agent
interactions, respectively. Depending on whether agent interactions occur in turns or concurrently, the
edges are graph game are labeled with single agent actions or concurrent agent actions. The synthesis of
the controller under these specifications corresponds to solving the graph game with agent objectives.
The specifications considered in most existing work is qualitative. They do not take into account
practical aspects such as cost of interaction, amount of resources of agents, and so on. For example,
crucial details in the design of a controller for a multi-robot surveillance task would include the battery
resource consumed by robots in traversing uneven terrains in the environment, total distance/area
covered by each and all robots, and so on. These details cannot be represented qualitatively.
A richer form of specification is quantitative. Agent interactions in a graph game should also include
the quantitative costs incurred by agents during interactions (e.g. battery consumption). W.l.o.g, costs
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incurred by different agents along the same transition may differ. In addition, agents may be constrains
on their resources (e.g. fixed battery life). Hence, agents may also have the quantiative objective to opti-
mize their total cost while fulfilling their qualitative objective. Synthesis of controllers from quantitative
specifications entails solving a quantitative graph games under qualitative and quantitative objectives
for its agents. Finally, the objective of agents is to optimize its own cost, and not to play against other
agents. Nash equilibrium is a popular choice of solution concept in such non-competitive games [19].
Therefore, synthesis of controllers in quantitative games with quantitative agent objectives is reduced
to Nash equilibria computation in these games.
Intuitively, Nash equilibria assigns a strategy to each agent such that unilateral deviations by an
agent are not beneficial to it [18]. The computation of Nash equilibrium has been extensively studied
for simple one-shot games [7, 9, 10], repeated games [1, 4, 17]. The problem has been investigated
on concurrent graph games [21] and turn-based quantitative games under reachability objective [6].
Equilibria computation for quantitative concurrent games is open.
This paper studies Nash equilibria computation for quantitative concurrent graph games with reach-
ability objective. Each agent accumulates its cost until it reaches its set of target states in the graph
game, and aims to minimize its cost. We show that determining the existence of Nash equilibria in such
games is NP-complete, in general. Our proof argument follows that unilateral deviations for a Nash
equilibria by an agent are punished by the coalition of the remaining agents. We also study the problem
of computing the set of all Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria. We prove that the problem is exponential
in the worst-case, and identify special cases that admit polynomial-time solutions. We also give a com-
prehensive analysis of the complexity of related problems such as the price of stability and the price of
anarchy.
2 Quantitative concurrent graph games
Model description A quantitative concurrent graph game, abbreviated to game or QCG, is a tuple
G = 〈Ω, V, {Actα}α∈Ω, v0, δ, cost, F 〉, with set of players Ω = {α1, . . . αk}, set of states V , initial state
vo ∈ V . The set of actions for player α are given by Actα. The transition funciton is given by δ :
V ×∏α∈Ω Actα → V . Alternately, we use (u, a, w) ∈ δ to mean w = δ(u, a). The cost function cost :
V ×∏α∈Ω Actα × V → NΩ assigns a cost vector (costα)α∈Ω to every transition in δ, where the α-th
element denotes cost for Player α. The target function F : Ω→ 2V prescribes the target set of states of
each player.
An outcome of a game G is a (finite or infinite) sequence of subsequent transitions beginning in the
initial state. Concretely, the sequence ρ = τ0, τ1 . . . , where τi = (si, ~ai, ti) ∈ δ for all i ≥ 0, is an outcome
of the game if s0 is the initial state, and for all i ≥ 0, si+1 = ti. An outcome ρ is said to visit state s if
there exists a j ≥ 0 s.t. sj = s. An outcome is said to visit a set of states if it visits at least one member
state of the set.
The cost of a player from an outcome is computed by an accumulation of costs incurred by the
player along transitions in the outcome. In a reachability game, the cost of a player is the sum of costs
incurred along the outcome until its target set is visited for the first time. Formally, the cost of player
α in the outcome ρ, denoted costα(ρ), is Σ
l
j=0costα(τj) when l ≥ 0 is the first index in ρ at which F (α)
is visited, and the cost is ∞ if F (α) is not visited in ρ. The objective of each player is to minimize its
cost (and in particular, to reach its target).
Nash equilibrium A strategy for Player α is a function σα : δ
∗ → Actα which decides the player’s
next action based on the history of transitions taken so far1. The set of strategies of player α are
denoted by Sα. A strategy σα is memoryless if, intuitively, it prescribes the next action depending
only on the current state. That is, if for every two finite outcomes ρ = τ0 · · · τk and ρ′ = τ ′0 · · · τ ′m with
1The careful reader may notice that the history of actions would have sufficed. We choose to work with the history of
transitions for cleaner proofs.
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τk = (sk, ~ak, tk) and τ
′
m = (s
′
m,
~bm, t
′
m), if tk = t
′
m, then σα(ρ) = σα(ρ
′). A memoryless strategy can
thus be defined as σα : V → Actα.
A profile is a tuple of strategies P = 〈σα〉α∈Ω, where σα denotes a strategy for player α. The
profile P induces an outcome, denoted outcome(P ), in which every player conforms to σα. Concretely,
outcome(P ) = τ0τ1 · · · with τi = (si, ~ai, si+1) for every i ≥ 0, where s0 is the initial state, and for every
player α ∈ Ω it holds that ( ~a0)α = σα() and (~aj)α = σα(τ0 · · · τj−1) for every j > 0. We denote by
outcomeu(P ) the outcome of the profile P in the game Gu with initial state u.
The cost for player α in profile P , denoted by costα(P ), is the cost it receives in outcome(P ). The
cost of a profile P , denoted cost(P ), is the tuple 〈costα(P )〉α∈Ω.
Let P [α← σ′α] denote the profile obtained from profile P when the strategy of Player α is unilaterally
changed to σ′α. A profile is in Nash equilibrium, NE in short, if no player can obtain a lower cost by
unilaterally changing its strategy.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibria) A profile = 〈σα〉α∈Ω is said to be in Nash equilibrium if for all players
α ∈ Ω, and all strategies σ′α ∈ Sα of player α it holds that costα(P ) ≤ costα(P [α← σ′α]).
We say an outcome pi is in NE if there exists a NE with outcome pi. A cost vector ~c ∈ N is said to be an
NE if there exists an NE P for which ~c = cost(P ). A cost tuple ~c is a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium
if there does not exist a NE ~d ∈ NΩ such that ~d 6= ~c and ~d ≤ ~c. It is easy to see that a game with NE
also has pareto-optimal NE.
Examples
1. [No NE] Figure 1 represents an XOR game with two players, states {s, t}, actions {a, b} for both
players, initial state s, target set {t} for both players. The transition function and associated costs
are shown in the figure.
It is easy to see that from every outcome of the game, one of the players can reduce their cost by
flipping their actions. Hence, the game has no Nash equilibria.
s t
(a, a), (b, b)
cost = (0,1)
(a, b), (b, a)
cost = (1,0)
Figure 1: No NE
2. [Exponentially many NE] Figure 2 represents a two-player game, states {s0, . . . , sn, t}, actions
{a, b} for both players, initial state s0, target set {t} for both players. The transition and cost
functions are shown in the figure.
In this game there exists a NE with cost (x, 2n − 1 − x) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 2n − 1. If (bn−1 · b0)2 is
the binary expansion of x then Player 1 can force the outcome to take cost (2i, 0) exactly when
bi = 1, using the following strategy: Both players declare that they will take action a in state sn if
cost (2i, 0) is not taken exactly at bi = 1. Taking action a in sn will incur a cost of (2
n, 2n), hence
no agent has an incentive to deviate.
3. [Infinite NE but one Pareto-optimal NE] Figure 3 is a two player game with states {s, t, sink},
actions {a, b} for both players, initial state s, and target set {t} for both players. Transitions and
costs are as shown in Figure 3, and missing transitions from s go to sink.
It is easy to see that an outcome of the form (a, a)k(b, b) is a NE with cost vector (k + 1, k + 1)
for k ≥ 0. Clearly, there is only one Pareto-optimal NE i.e. (1, 1).
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s0 s1 s2 sn−1 sn t
(a, a), (b, b)
cost = (0,1)
(a, b), (b, a)
cost = (1,0)
(a, a), (b, b)
cost = (0,2)
(a, b), (b, a)
cost = (2,0)
(a, a), (b, b)
cost = (0, 2n−1)
(a, b), (b, a)
cost = (2n−1, 0)
(a, a), (a, b), (b, a)
cost = (2n, 2n)
(b, b)
cost = (0, 0)
Figure 2: Exponentially many NE
s t
(a, a), cost = (1,1)
(b, b)
cost = (1,1)
Figure 3: Infinite NE
Problem formulation Examples 1- 3 give rise to the following questions pertaining to Nash equilibria
in QCGs.
P1 Existence problem: Does a given QCG have an NE?
P2 Bounded Pareto-optimal NE: Are the number of Pareto-optimal NE in a QCG bounded?
P3 Computation problem: If P2 holds, can one compute the set of all Pareto-optimal NE cost-vectors?
P4 Threshold problem: The decision version of P3 checks whether given a QCG and a cost vector ~c,
does there exist an NE with cost vector ~d such that ~d ≤ ~c?
This paper analyses each one of the above stated problems. For simplicity, all player actions are enabled
in every state in the game Our definitions and results remain valid when some actions may be disabled
in some states.
Representation of games In this paper, we distinguish between when the number of players is fixed
(such as 2-player game) and when it is given as part of the input.
The size of the transition function and cost function play a crucial role in the analysis of QCGs.
Consider a game in which each player chooses from at least two actions. The number of transitions in
this game is exponential in the number of players. Hence, a naive tabular representation of the transition
and cost functions is exponential in size of the number of players. This encoding for the transition and
cost functions leads to skewed analysis, and precludes polynomial time reductions to problems involving
games with multiple players with more than one action to choose from.
To this end, we assume that the transition function is encoded by a circuit, and in particular a model
that can be efficiently queried. For example, consider a state u from which there is a transition to state v
if all players play a, and to state w otherwise. This is succinctly represented by the circuit implementing
(if ~a then v, else w). Our algorithms work in polynomial time in the size of these circuits, and our
hardness proofs are able to output them.
The cost function is also encoded using similar circuits. The representation the cost values in unary
or binary can cause a difference, and hence will be explicitly mentioned.
Finally, the remaining components of the game, namely states, actions, and accepting sets are en-
coded naturally as part of the input.
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3 Characterization of NE
In this section we give a characterization of (Pareto optimal) NE, by showing that they are attained
by strategies with a special structure. This provides intuition on the behavior of players in an NE, and
forms the basis for the algorithm described in Section 4.
3.1 Game Against α
Consider a game G = 〈Ω, V,Act, v0, δ, cost, F 〉 and a player α ∈ Ω. We define the game against α, denoted
Gα̂, to be the two-player concurrent game obtained from G as follows. The players are α and the coalition
α, which comprises the set Ω \ {α} of all other players. The goal of Player α is to minimize the cost
prescribed by costα until reaching Fα, and the goal of the coalition is to either prevent Player α from
reaching Fα, or to maximize the cost prescribed by costα until reaching Fα.
For every state u ∈ V , let Cα(u) be the maximal value that can be guaranteed by the coalition in
Gu. Formally, Cα(u) = maxσ∈SΩ\{α} minτ∈Sα costα(outcomeu(σ, τ)).2
Remark 2 The reader may wonder why we look at the optimal value for the coalition, and not for Player
α. Intuitively, we use the game against α to allow the coalition to “punish” Player α for deviating from
a suggested profile (supposedly an NE). Thus, we must fix the punishing strategy for the coalition before
knowing how Player α deviates. Cα(u) is then the maximal punishment against Player α.
We start by showing that Cα(u) is computable in polynomial time for every α ∈ Ω and every u ∈ V .
Theorem 3 Consider a game G with costs represented in binary. Cα(u) is computable in polynomial
time for every α ∈ Ω and every u ∈ V . Moreover, Cα(u) is attained by a memoryless strategies for both
players (independent of u).
Proof: For a strategy σ ∈ Πα, denote by Gσ the weighted (possibly infinite) graph obtained from G
by applying the actions prescribed by σ. The elements of G such as cost and F are naturally extended
to Gσ.
Observe that it suffices to prove memoryless strategies exist for the coalition. Indeed, once a mem-
oryless strategy σ is fixed by the coalition, the corresponding strategy for Player α is to choose the
minimal-cost path to Fα (w.r.t. costα) in Gσ (which, if σ is memoryless, has |V | states), which is clearly
implemented by a memoryless strategy.
Let U ⊆ V be the set of states from which the coalition can force the game never to reach Fα.
Using the results of [11] on concurrent reachability games, we can compute U in polynomial time, and
moreover - a memoryless strategy suffices for the coalition to keep the game in V \ Fα (and clearly in
this case, the strategy of Player α is irrelevant, as Cα(u) =∞ for u ∈ U). We henceforth assume that U
has already been computed. We remark that this assumption is not actually needed, as our algorithm
will also compute this set as a by-product, but it slightly simplifies the correctness proof.
We now describe an algorithm to compute Cα(u) for every state u ∈ V \U . The algorithms stores a
value T (v) for every state v ∈ V , which is updated in every iteration. We refer to Ti(v) as the state of
T (v) in iteration i of the algorithm.
Initially, T0(v) = 0 for v ∈ Fα and T0(v) = ∞ otherwise. In every iteration, we make the following
update to every state:
Ti+1(v) = max {min {costα(v, a, b) + Ti(δ(v, a, b)) : a ∈ Actα} : b ∈ Actα} (1)
The algorithm halts once a fixpoint has been reached, namely when Ti+1 ≡ Ti. At every iteration i,
we associate with Ti(v) strategies µi ∈ Πα and νi ∈ Πα that are obtained
2A priori, the max should be sup. However, as we shall see in Theorem 3, memoryless strategies suffice, and hence
Cα(u) is always attained.
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We now turn to prove that the algorithm terminates within |V | iterations, and that upon termination,
we have T|V |(v) = Cα(v) for every state v. To this end, we prove the following inductive invariant: Let
Si(v) = max
σ∈Πα
{min {costα(outcomev(σ, τ)) : τ ∈ Πα and |outcomev(σ, τ)| ≤ i}},
where |outcomeu(σ, τ)| is the number of transitions along the path until Fα is reached (and is ∞ is Fα
is not reached). We claim that at iteration i, we have Si(v) = Ti(v). That is, Ti(v) is the maximal value
that the coalition can guarantee of a cheapest path to Fα of length at most i (there may be longer yet
cheaper paths).
For i = 0 this is trivial to observe: in Fα the coalition can guarantee 0, and everywhere else ∞.
Assume that the claim is correct for i, we prove for i + 1. For readability, in the following we always
have a ∈ Actα, b ∈ Actα, τ, τ ′ ∈ Πα, σ, σ′ ∈ Πα, and v′ = δ(v, a, b). By the induction hypothesis, we
have that
Ti+1(v) = max
b
{
min
a
{costα(v, a, b) + Si(δ(v, a, b))}
}
(2)
= max
b
{
min
a
{
costα(v, a, b) + max
σ
{
min
τ
{costα(outcomev′(σ, τ)) : |outcomev′(σ, τ))| ≤ i}
}}}
(3)
= max
b
{
min
a
{
max
σ
{
min
τ
{costα(v, a, b) + costα(outcomev′(σ, τ)) : |outcomev′(σ, τ))| ≤ i}
}}}
(4)
= max
b
{
max
σ
{
min
a
{
min
τ
{costα(v, a, b) + costα(outcomev′(σ, τ)) : |outcomev′(σ, τ))| ≤ i}
}}}
(5)
= max
σ′
{
min
τ ′
{costα(v, σ′(v), τ ′(v)) + costα(outcomev′(σ′, τ ′)) : |outcomev′(σ′, τ ′))| ≤ i}
}
(6)
= max
σ′
{
min
τ ′
{costα(outcomev(σ′, τ ′)) : |outcomev(σ′, τ ′))| ≤ i+ 1}
}
= Si+1(v) (7)
where the transitions are as follows:
(1)-(2) is by definition of Si(δ(v, a, b)).
(2)-(3) is by distributivity of min and max over +.
(3)-(4) is the heart of the proof. Trivially, we can write (3) ≥ (4) (since min max is less than max min).
For the converse inequality, notice that in (3) the coalition chooses a maximizing strategy σ given
the action a. However, σ does not play a role in costα(v, a, b). Therefore, the coalition may as well
choose a strategy σ that maximizes costα(outcomev′(σ, τ)) for every v
′ (which is determined by
a). This new strategy is now independent of a, so we can maximize it before minimizing over a,
as done in (4), and the coalition is guaranteed not to reduce the cost.
(4)-(5) is an aggregation of the first action with the rest of the strategy.
(5)-(6) is by the definition of the cost of an outcome.
We conclude that Si ≡ Ti for all i.
We now prove that the algorithm reaches a fixed point within |V | iterations. Consider a state
v ∈ V \ U . By definition, for every strategy σ ∈ Πα, Player α has a strategy to reach Fα from v.
For every such strategy σ, consider µ ∈ arg minτ∈Πα costα(outcomeu(σ, τ)), then w.l.o.g. we can assume
outcome(σ, µ) is a simple path (i.e. no state is visited more than once). Indeed, if a state is visited twice,
then Player α can shorten the path without increasing the cost. Moreover, this simple path has minimal
cost among all available paths from v to Fα in Gσ.
We thus have that
Cα(v) = max
σ∈Πα
min
τ∈Πα
costα(outcomev(σ, τ))
= max
σ∈Πα
{min {costα(outcomev(σ, τ)) : τ ∈ Πα and |outcomev(σ, τ)| ≤ |V |}} = S|V |(v).
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Since S|V |(v) = T|V |(v), we conclude that the algorithm terminates within |V | iterations, and computes
Cα(v) for every state v ∈ V . Moreover, when Ti reaches a fixed point, we can extract from Equation 1
a memoryless strategy for the coalition, by choosing the maximizing action at each state.
3.2 Characterizing NE
We are now ready to characterize Pareto-optimal NE profiles. We show that it is enough to consider
strategies of a the following form: intuitively, the players agree on a short outcome and play according
to it. If Player α deviates from the outcome, the other players form a coalition and play according to
Gα̂, as per Section 3.1.
Let G = 〈Ω, V,Act, v0, δ, cost, F 〉, and consider a strategy profile P = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉. For every player
α ∈ Ω, consider the game Gα̂. The optimal strategy for the coalition in Gα̂ induces a strategy χαβ for
every β 6= α, such that the combination of these strategies forms the strategy for the coalition.
Let pi = outcome(P ) = (v0,~a0, v1), (v1,~a1, v2), . . .. We define a new strategy profile P˜ = 〈σ˜1, . . . , σ˜k〉
as follows. For every β ∈ Ω, as long as all other players follow pi, Player β plays according to σi. If, at
time i, Player α 6= β deviates from pi such that instead of transition (vi,~ai, vi+1), the transition that is
taken is (vi,~a
′, v′), then Player β starts playing χαβ from v
′.
Clearly outcome(P ) = outcome(P˜ ). We refer to the profile P˜ as a second–strike profile.
Lemma 4 If P is an NE, then P˜ is also an NE.
Proof: We prove that P˜ is an NE by showing that no player can beneficially deviate.
Let P = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉. Assume by way of contradiction that outcome(P˜ ) is not an NE. Thus, there
exists some player α ∈ Ω and a strategy σ′ for Player α that is a beneficial deviation from P˜ . That is,
let d = costα(outcome(P )) = costα(outcome(P˜ )) and d˜ = costα(outcome(P˜ [m← σ′])), then d˜ < d.
Let pi = outcome(P ) = (v0,~a0, v1), (v1,~a1, v2), . . ., and P˜ = outcome(P˜ [1 ← σ′]) = (v0,~a0, v1), . . .
(vi−1,~ai−1, vi), (vi,~b, ui+1), (ui+1, ~λi+1, ui+2), . . . where i is the minimal index such that ~ai 6= ~bi, i.e.,
the first time when Player α deviates from σα, and λi are played as per the second-strike strategies of
Ω \ {α}. Define c = costα((v0,~a0, v1), . . . , (vi−1,~ai−1, vi)) to be the cost accumulated by Player α along
pi up to vi, and e = costα((vi,~ai, vi+1), . . .) be the cost accumulated on the suffix from vi along pi (recall
that once Fα is reached, the cost does not accumulate, and is finite). Thus, d = c+ costα(vi−1,~a, vi) + e.
Similarly, let e˜ = costα((ui+1, ~λi, ui+2), (ui+2, ~λi+2, ui+3), . . ., then d˜ = c+ costα(vi,~bi) + e˜. Since d˜ < d,
it follows that
costα(vi,~bi) + e˜ < costα(vi−1,~a) + e. (8)
By Theorem 3, the second-strike strategies ~χ = (χαβ)β 6=α satisfy costα(outcomeui+1(τ, ~χ)) ≥ Cα(ui+1)
for every τ ∈ Πα. In particular, we have that
e˜ ≥ Cα(ui+1). (9)
Viewing Cα(ui+1) on the contrapositive, we get that for every strategy ~σ ∈ ΠΩ\{α} there exists a
strategy τ ∈ Πα such that costα(outcome(τ, ~σ)) ≤ Cα(ui+1). Let τ ′ be such a strategy for Player α
against the profile 〈σβ〉β 6=α ∈ ΠΩ\{α} from ui+1, we augment τ ′ to the following strategy: play according
to σα along pi up to vi, and then play ~b as σ
′ does. Then, proceed with τ ′ from ui+1. We show that τ ′
is a beneficial deviation from P , in contradiction to the assumption that P is an NE.
Let pi′ = outcome(P [α← τ ′]) = (v0,~a0, v1), . . . (vi−1,~ai−1, vi), (vi,~bi, ui+1), (ui+1, ~λi, wi+2), . . . where
λi are the actions prescribed by P [α ← τ ′] from ui+1. As before, we let d′ = costα(pi′) and e′ =
costα((ui+1, ~λi), . . .), then d
′ = c+ costα(vi,~bi) + e′, with e′ ≤ Cα(ui+1)
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Combining this with Equations (8) and (9), we now have
d′ = c+ costα(vi,~bi) + e′
≤ c+ costα(vi,~bi) + Cα(ui+1)
≤ c+ costα(vi,~bi) + e˜
< c+ costα(vi−1,~a) + e = d
and we are done.
Consider a profile P˜ for some (not necessarily NE) profile P , and a player α ∈ Ω. Suppose Player α
deviates from P˜ , and that the first deviation from the outcome is the transition (v,~b, u). By Lemma 4,
it follows that a profile is an NE iff no such player can deviate and gain more than Cα(u), plus the cost
of the deviating edge.
Formally, we have the following characterization.
Theorem 5 A profile P with outcome pi = (v0,~a0, v1), . . . is an NE iff the following holds. For every
Player α ∈ Ω, for every prefix pi[0,j] = (v0,~a0, v1), . . . , (vj−1,~aj−1, vj) of pi, and for every action a′ ∈ Actα
such that (~aj)α 6= a′, let ~b ∈ Act be the action vector obtained from ~aj by changing the action of Player α
to a′, and let u = δ(vj ,~b), then costα(pi[0,j]) + costα(vj ,~b) + Cα(u) ≥ costα(pi).
Theorem 5, combined with Theorem 3 almost give us an algorithmic procedure for deciding whether
a profile is an NE. Missing is a bound on the length of the outcome (until Fα is reached for all relevant
players). We now proceed to obtain such a bound, by bounding the memory required from Pareto-optimal
NE strategies.
Let G = 〈Ω, V,Act, v0, δ, cost, F 〉, we obtain from G the F -expanded game G? = 〈Ω, V ×2Ω,Act, (v0, ∅),
δ?, cost?, F ?〉 as follows. We construct a copy of G for each subset of the players. Intuitively, the subset
denotes which players have already visited their target sets. Thus, the states are V × 2Ω, and the initial
state is (v0, ∅). The actions are the same as those of G. The transition function is defined as follows:
for a state (v, S) and action vector ~a, we have that δ?((v, S),~a) = (v′, S′) where v′ = δ(v,~a) and
S′ = S ∪ {α ∈ Ω : v ∈ Fα}. That is, all players who reached their target by state v are added to S. The
cost function is defined as follows: for Player α ∈ Ω we have that
cost?α((v, S),~a) =
{
costα(v,~a) α /∈ S
0 α ∈ S
That is, once a player has reached Fα, which is encoded in S, no further cost is incurred. Finally, we
set F ?α = {(v, S) : α ∈ S}.
Clearly there is a bijection between strategies of G and G?, and this induces to a bijection between
outcomes, and between profiles.
Consider a profile P ? in G?. We define the set of winners W ⊆ Ω to consist of all players α such that
Fα is visited along outcome(P
?). By the construction of G?, outcome(P ?) eventually reaches the copy
V ×W , and stays there (with all players in W accumulating cost 0, and all other players incurring cost
∞ by definition).
For a set W of winners, we say that a transition (x,~a, y) (either in G or G?) is safe for W if for every
player α ∈ Ω \W and every action ~b that is obtained from ~a by (possibly) changing the action of Player
α, the resulting transition (x,~b, z) satisfies Cα(z) =∞.
The following is an easy observation.
Lemma 6 1. In an NE profile P with winners W , the outcome can only take safe transitions for
W .
2. Consider a state (u,W ) ∈ G? as an initial state, then for a profile P whose outcome remains in
V ×W and takes only safe transitions for W , the second-strike profile P˜ is an NE.
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We are now ready to characterize NEPO by means of the expanded game.
Lemma 7 Let ~c ∈ NEPO(v0), then there exist an NE profile P ? in G? with cost(P ?) = ~c and a set of
winners W such that outcome(P ?) forms a lasso, namely a a simple path followed by a simple cycle, in
G?.
Proof: Let ~c ∈ NEPO(v0), then there exists an NE profile P which attains it, and moreover, by
Lemma 4 we can assume P to be a second-strike profile. Let P ? be the corresponding profile for G?.
Let pi = outcome(P ?), then we can write pi = µ · η where µ is a maximal finite prefix of pi from (v0, ∅)
that does not visit V ×W , and η is the infinite suffix within V ×W . We now modify pi to obtain a new
outcome, with the desired properties, that induces an NE as per Theorem 5.
By Lemma 6, all transitions in pi are safe for W . Thus, as long as we only use transitions that are
taken in pi, the players in Ω \W cannot gain by deviating. We henceforth focus only on the players in
W .
We consider the suffix η. Since η is infinite and V ×W is finite, then there exist cycles in η. Write
η = η1 · η2 · η3 where η1 is a simple path, η2 is the first simple cycle in η, and η3 is the remaining
suffix. We claim that replacing η by η1 · ηω2 induces an NE profile that attains cost ~c. Indeed, observe
that for the players in W , the cost does not change, and they cannot deviate by gaining, as they do
not accumulate cost once V ×W is reached (and since µ remains unchanged, there is no incentive to
deviate).
Next, consider the prefix µ. If µ contains a cycle, we claim that it can be removed: indeed, write
µ = µ1 · µ2 · µ3, where µ2 is a cycle, then the players can modify their strategies such that µ1 · µ3 is the
outcome (or prefix thereof). Clearly cost(µ1 · µ3) ≤ cost(µ). It remains to show that this is still an NE
profile. However, observe that any beneficial deviation from µ1 · µ3 induces a beneficial deviation from
µ, but since µ is part of an NE, this cannot exist.
Since ~c is Pareto-optimal, there cannot be an NE profile that attains a lower cost, so we conclude
that the above truncation yields cost exactly ~c.
We conclude that pi can be assumed a lasso in G?.
By the structure of G?, if a state (v′, S′) is reachable from the state (v, S) in G?, then S ⊆ S′. Thus,
a maximal simple path in G? is of length Ω× V . It follows that the maximal length of a simple path in
G? is |Ω| · |V |. Furthermore, note that a simple cycle within V ×W for some set W corresponds to a
simple cycle in V . From Lemma 7, we can conclude the following.
Corollary 8 Let ~c ∈ NEPO(v0), then it is attained by an NE profile P with in G with a set of winners
W,such that outcome(P ) = µ · ηω, where µ is a path of length at most |Ω| · |V | that visits Fα for all
α ∈W , and η is a simple cycle.
4 Computing NE
Combining Theorems 3 and 5, and Corollary 8, gives us a simple algorithm for deciding whether ~c ∈
NEPO. Given the game G, we look for a path of the form µ · η as per Corollary 8, and check that the
condition described in Theorem 5 holds for this path.
Note that checking the latter can be done in polynomial time, since we only need to check that (1)
for deviations of all the players along the prefix µ, and that (2) once we reach the cycle η, for the set of
winners W , all the edges along η are safe for W .
We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 9 The problem of deciding, given a game G and a cost vector ~c, whether ~c ∈ NEPO is in NP.
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4.1 Computing NEPO
A broader problem relating to NE is that of computing the entire set NEPO(v0) of Pareto-optimal NE.
As it turns out, solving this problem provides insight to the effect of different parameters of the game
on the complexity of the NE-with-threshold problem.
We now describe an algorithm to compute NEPO(u) for every state u in a game G. Since our char-
acterization of NE in Section 3 utilizes the F - expanded graph G?, it will be easier to work with G?.
Broadly, the algorithms computes for every state u, the set of cost vectors ~c from which there exists a
lasso witness, as per Lemma 7.
The algorithm proceeds by iterating over all subsets W ⊆ Ω, and computing for every state u of G?,
the set NEWPO(u) of cost vectors ~c for which there exists an NE P
? with set of winners W .
By Lemma 6, only safe transitions for W are relevant when the set of winners is W . Thus, we start
by computing the set of safe transitions, and removing from G? all other transitions. We refer to the
obtained game graph as G?|W Clearly this can be done in polynomial time in the size of G?. Note that
in particular, every state u in G?|W satisfies Cα(u) =∞. This means that the actions of the players in
Ω \W effectively do not matter, as their cost will inevitably remain ∞.
We assume w.l.o.g. that all states in G?|W are reachable from (v0, ∅), otherwise we can remove the
non-reachable ones. Moreover, we assume the underlying graph has strongly connected components
reachable from (v0, ∅), otherwise there cannot be an outcome, and we are done.
Note that once V ×W is reached in G?|W , there exists a cycle in V ×W that satisfies condition (2)
of Lemma 6, and hence induces an NE.
The algorithm stores, for every state u ∈ G?|W , a set D(u) of pairs (i,~c) such that (i,~c) ∈ D(u) iff
there exists a path in G?|W of length at most i from u to V ×W with cost ~c that satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 7. The algorithm then iterates over the length i, as follows.
Initilization: For i = 0, we add (0,~0W ) ∈ D(u) for every u ∈ V × W , where ~0W has 0 in the
coordinates corresponding to W , and ∞ everywhere else.
Update: At iteration i, we add (i,~c) to D(u) iff the following holds.
1. There exists a transition (u,~a, v) in G?|W and (j,~c′) ∈ D(v) such that j < i and ~c = cost(u,~a)+~c′.
2. For every state w and every action ~b that differs from ~a only in coordinate α ∈ Ω, let v′ = δ(u,~b),
then for every (j, ~d) ∈ D(v), if j < i then (~c)α ≤ costα(u,~b) + ~d.
The algorithm terminates at iteration |V | × |Ω|, and returns the cost vectors in D(v0) (or a Pareto
optimal subset thereof).
Clearly, in general the complexity of the algorithm is exponential in |Ω|, and is thus generally
exponential. We remark later on the effect of specific parameters on the complexity.
The correctness of the algorithm is easy to prove using the results of Section 3. By Theorem 5, all
the cost vectors we compute are indeed NE cost vectors. By Lemma 7, it is enough to check for paths
up to length |Ω| · |V |.
4.2 Polynomial-Time Fragments
As mentioned above, in general the algorithm we describe in Section 4.1 takes exponential time. In fact,
even when |Ω| is fixed, the algorithm can still take exponential time, depending on the size of NEPO(v0).
We now demonstrate two cases where NEPO can be computed in polynomial time. In Section 5, we show
that the restrictions in these fragments are tight, in the sense that removing any restriction makes the
problem NP-Hard.
Theorem 10 When |Ω| is fixed and cost is described in unary, computing NEPO(v0) can be done in
polynomial time.
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XXXXXXXXXXPlayers
Costs
Uniform Unary Binary
Fixed P P NP-Hard (ST)
Not fixed P (ST), NP-Hard NP-Hard (ST) NP-Hard (ST)
Table 1: Complexity of NE existence. (ST) stands for Single Target games. Note that hardness for a
fixed number of player applies already for 2 players.
Proof: Since |Ω| is fixed, the size of G? is O(|V |). By Lemma 7, every cost vector ~c ∈ NEPO(v0) is
attained by a profile whose outcome accumulates costs only along a path of length |Ω| · |V |. For unary
weights, the cost along a simple path is polynomial (in fact, linear), in the length of the path. That is, if
M is the maximal cost in G, the maximal cost a player can accumulate along such a path is M · |Ω| · |V |,
which is polynomial in the description of G. It follows that |NEPO(v0)| ≤ (M · |Ω| · |V |)|Ω|, which is
polynomial.
Thus, the number of updates that are done in every iteration of the algorithm is polynomially
bounded, and we conclude that the runtime of the algorithm is polynomial.
In the next case we make the following restrictions: first, the game is a joint target game, meaning
that Fα = T is the same set for all players α ∈ Ω, and second, that the game has uniform costs, meaning
that the cost of every transition is the same, and w.l.o.g. is ~1.
Theorem 11 Computing NEPO(v0) for joint-target games with uniform costs can be done in polynomial
time.
Proof: Notice that under the premise, NEPO(v0) consists of a single cost vector ~c, whose entries (which
are all equal, since the costs are uniform) are the length of the shortest path from v0 to T (the joint
target).
Thus, computing NEPO(v0) reduces to finding the shortest path from v0 to T , which can be done in
polynomial time.
5 Hardness Results
In this section we complete the complexity picture of computing NE, by providing hardness results.
Since we need a decision version of the problem, we use the most restricted version of the problem,
namely deciding whether an NE exists in a game.
In Section 4.2 we consider restrictions based on the following parameters: the number of players
(fixed or not), the cost function (uniform, unary, or binary), and whether there is a single target. In
this section, we provide tight hardness results to match the upper bounds in Section 4. Our results are
summarized in Table 1.
Theorem 12 The problem of deciding whether a game has an NE is NP-Hard for games with 2 players
and binary costs, even for single-target games.
Proof: We show that the problem is hard by a reduction from the NP-Hard problem PARTITION:
decide, given a set of natural numbers {x1, . . . , xn} encoded in binary, whether there exists a set I ⊆
{1, . . . , n} such that ∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i/∈I
xi.
The main ingredient in the reduction is a component similar to Example 2. This component consists
of n XOR games, where in XOR game i, the players incur cost of either (0, xi) or (xi, 0). Thus, the
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players partition the numbers between them. In order to ensure that the only possible NE corresponds
to an equal partition, another XOR-based component is used, which allows any player to deviate and
incur a total cost of slightly more than
∑n
i=1 xi/2. By carefully choosing the costs, this makes the only
possible NE have value
∑n
i=1 xi/2 for both players, which is possible iff there is an equal partition. We
now proceed to give the detailed construction.
Given an instance for PARTITION, we start by assuming all numbers are even (this can easily be
achieved by multiplying by 2). Let 2S =
∑n
i=1 xi, then the problem is equivalent to deciding whether
there exists I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that ∑i∈I xi = S.
We construct the following game G = 〈Ω, V,Act, s, δ, cost, F 〉. The set of players is Ω = {0, 1}. The
states are {v1, . . . , vn} ∪ {s, t1, t2, r1, r2}. The actions are Act0 = Act1 = {0, 1}. The initial state is s,
the target sets are F0 = F1 = {t2, t3}. We now turn to describe the transition function and the costs.
The game starts at state s. There, the players play a XOR game to determine whether the game
proceeds to t1 or to v1. No costs are incurred so far. At t1, the players again play a XOR game that
reaches t2 and ends the game. The costs are either (0, 1) or (1, 0). Observe that if the game proceeds
along s → t1 → t2, the outcome costs are either (S + 1, S) or (S, S + 1). Moreover, either player can
swap between these costs in the XOR game.
If the game proceeds to v1, then the outcome goes through the sequence of states v1 → v2 → . . . vn →
r1 → r2 as follows. At each state vi, the players play a XOR game that reaches vi+1 (or r1 from vn).
The cost of the transition is either (xi, 0) or (0, xi). This is similar to the construction in Example 2.
Intuitively, the players decide which of them sums xi, thus partitioning the numbers between them into
two disjoint sets. Finally, at r1, if both players agree, they proceed to r2 with cost (0, 0), and if either
of them does not agree, they proceed to r2 with cost (S + 2, S + 2), where S + 2 can be thought of as
∞, as it is larger than any other possible outcome.
Clearly the reduction can be done in polynomial time. We now claim that there exists a partition of
the instance iff the game has an NE, and moreover – if there exists an NE, its outcome cost is (S, S).
Observe that any NE in the game must have cost at most S for either player. Indeed, any player can
deviate to the path s→ t1 → t2 and play the XOR game at t1 to guarantee cost at most S.
Conversely, no NE can have cost less than S for a player. Indeed, a cost of less than S can only be
attained along the path to r2, and by the transition, it follows that if in outcome pi we have cost1(pi) = c,
then cost2(pi) = 2S − c. Thus, if one of the players has cost less than S, the other player has cost more
than S, which we showed is not an NE.
Thus, if there exists an NE, it has cost (S, S). It remains to show that there exists an NE iff there
exists a partition.
For the first direction, assume there exists a partition I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i/∈I
xi = S.
We show that there exists an NE with cost (S, S). The outcome of the NE is a path to r2, where at each
state vi, the players play the XOR game such that the cost is (xi, 0) if i ∈ I, and (0, xi) if i /∈ I. Finally,
at r1, they go to r2 with cost (0, 0). Clearly this outcome has cost (S, S). Note that no player has an
incentive to deviate toward t2 regardless of the strategy. In order to make sure no player deviates along
the path to r2, we note that the second-strike strategies along the path to r2 can use the transition with
costs (S + 2, S + 2) to make sure no deviation is beneficial.
Conversely, assume there does not exist a partition of the instance, then it is easy to see that no
outcome can give cost (S, S), and by the above, there cannot be an NE.
Theorem 13 The problem of deciding whether a game has an NE is NP-Hard for games with unary
costs, even for single-target games.
Proof: The result is obtained by a reduction from 3SAT, based on a quantitative variant of the
reduction in [2, Theorem 2]. For completeness, we give the complete construction.
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We show a reduction is from 3SAT. Consider a formula φ = c1∧ . . .∧cm over the variables x1, . . . , xn,
where each clause is of the form ci = (`
i
1 ∨ `i2 ∨ `i3) with each `jk being a variable or its negation.
We construct a game G = 〈Ω, V,Act, 1, δ, cost, F 〉 as follows: the players are Ω = {0,>1,⊥1, . . . ,>n,⊥n}.
That is, each variable xi is associated with two players, >i and ⊥i, and there is a special Player 0.
The states are
V = {1, . . . ,m,m+ 1} ∪ {>1,⊥1, . . . ,>n,⊥n}
∪ {〈xi, j〉, 〈¬xi, j〉 : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Note thatm+1 is a special state that does not correspond to a clause. The target sets are {>1,⊥1, . . . ,>n,⊥n,m+ 1}
for all players.
We now turn to describe the transitions, actions, and costs. See Figure
TODO↑: figure ?
The game starts at state 1, corresponding to clause c1.
• In state j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Player 0 chooses a state 〈`, j〉 for a literal ` that appears in cj . That is,
Player 0 has 3 choices.3 The actions of all the other players are ignored. The cost of this transition
is 0 for all players.
• In state 〈xi, j〉, Player 0 and Player >i play a XOR game that can go either to state j + 1 or to
>i. Intuitively, Player >i can either let Player 0 continue to the next clause, or “stop” the game
and go to >i.
The cost of the transition to >i is 1 for Player >i and for Player 0, and is 0 for all other Players.
Intuitively, Player >i has to pay cost of 1 for causing the game to deviate, and Player 0 incurs a
cost of 1 for this deviation.
The cost of the transition to j + 1 is 2 for Player ⊥i and 0 for all other players. Intuitively, ⊥i is
penalized, since xi was chosen to be true. Note that there is no deviation Player ⊥i can take at
this point.
• Dually, in state 〈¬xi, j〉 Player 0 and Player ⊥i play a XOR game that can go either to state j+ 1
or to ⊥i. Again, the cost of the transition to ⊥i is 1 for Player ⊥i and for Player 0, and is 0 for
all other Players, and the cost for the transition to j + 1 has cost 2 for >i.
We claim that φ is satisfiable iff there exists an NE in the game.
For the first direction, assume φ is satisfiable, and let pi be a satisfying assignment (i.e., pi :
{x1, . . . , xn} → {>,⊥}). We construct strategies for the Players as follows: At each state j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
Player 0 chooses a literal ` that is assigned to true in pi. Then, at each state of the form 〈xi, j〉 or 〈¬xi, j〉,
Player 0 continues to state j + 1. The strategies of the other players are such that they cooperate and
never cause the game to end up in >i or ⊥i. We claim this is an NE. First, observe that in this profile,
Player 0 has cost 0, which is optimal. For the other players, consider a variable xi. Since pi is a consistent
assignment, then it cannot be the case that both 〈xi, j〉 and 〈¬xi, j′〉 are visited, since one of them is
false, and will not be chosen by Player 0 in this profile. W.l.o.g. assume pi(xi) = >, then 〈¬xi, j〉 is never
visited for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m. This means that ⊥i never gets to influence the game. In addition, the cost
for Player >i is 0, since no state of the form 〈¬xi, j′〉 is visited, and since Player >i never deviates to
state >i. Since a cost of 0 is optimal, we conclude that the profile is an NE.
Conversely, assume there exists an NE in the game. We claim that φ is satisfiable.
Assume by way of contradiction that for some variable xi, both 〈xi, j〉 and 〈¬xi, j′〉 are visited for
some 1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ m. W.l.o.g. assume j < j′ (the case where j′ < j is symmetric). Consider the cost
incurred by Player >i. Since 〈¬xi, j′〉 is visited after 〈xi, j〉, it follows that Player >i does not stop the
game at 〈xi, j〉. However, Player >i incurs a cost of 2 when exiting 〈¬xi, j′〉. Therefore, if the profile is
fixed, Player >i can gain by deviating at 〈xi, j〉 and stopping the game, and paying 1 instead of 2.
3Note that our definition of V includes states that are not reachable, namely literals that do not appear in the clause.
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Thus, if the profile causes the game to end in state m+ 1, then it induces a consistent assignment.
Moreover, since Player 0 can only choose satisfying literals in each clause, we get that the induced
assignment is satisfying.
It remains to show that the game does end in m+1. Indeed, otherwise some player >i or ⊥i stopped
the game at some point. However, in this case Player 0 has cost of 1, and can deviate unilaterally to
reroute the game back to m+ 1, so the profile is not an NE, in contradiction to the assumption.
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 14 The problem of deciding whether a game has an NE is NP-Hard for games with uniform
costs.
Proof: We show a reduction from the NP-Hard problem HAMPATH: given a directed graph G and
a designated vertex s, decide whether there exists a Hamiltonian path starting from s in G.
Intuitively, given G = 〈V,E〉 where V is a set of n vertices and E ⊆ V × V are the edges, and given
s ∈ V , the output of the reduction is a game G whose players are V and whose states contain V , as
well as additional components. The target set of player V contains the vertex v (and some additional
states of the game). Intuitively, the game proceeds as follows: if all the players agree on a path through
the graph from s, then that path is taken. However, any player can deviate (and effectively “stop” the
game) by incurring an overall cost of slightly more than n. In addition, we construct the game such that
the only possible NE must induce a path through G from s.
If there is a Hamiltonian path from s, all players incur cost of at most n on this path, so it is an NE.
Otherwise, every path either repeats a vertex, or misses a vertex. In the former case, a player whose
vertex is missed can surely gain by deviating and stopping the game. If no vertices are missed, then
some vertex is visited for the first time after more than n transitions. By carefully specifying the costs,
we ensure that the corresponding player benefits by deviating and stopping the game.
We proceed to give the complete details.
Given G = 〈V,E〉 where V is a set of n vertices and E ⊆ V × V are the edges, and given s ∈ V ,
we construct a game G = 〈Ω, S,Act, v0, δ, cost, F 〉 as follows. The players are the vertices of the graph,
Ω = V . The states of the game are S = V ∪ E ∪ {q0, q1, . . . , q2n+1} ∪ ({r0, r1, . . . r2n+3} × V ). The
costs are uniformly 1 on all transitions. The target sets are as follows: for every v ∈ V = Ω, Fv =
{v, q2n−1, (r2n+3, v)}.
We now turn to describe the transitions and actions.
• The game starts at q0. There, the players play an n-way XOR game to choose whether to proceed
to s (the designated vertex in the graph) or to q0.
• From q0 the game proceeds along the path q0 → q1 → . . . q2n+1 regardless of the actions. Note
that the cost to all players in this outcome is 2n + 1 (as there are 2n + 1 transitions from q0 to
q2n+1).
• For every state v ∈ V (and in particular for s), each player chooses an edge e = (v, u) ∈ E for
some u ∈ V . If all players agree on the same edge, the game proceeds to state e, and then to u
regardless of the actions.
Otherwise, intuitively, each player v ∈ V can cause the game to proceed to (r0, v). Formally, the
action of each Player v prescribes a number fv, and the game proceeds to state (r0, f) where
f =
∑
v∈V fv mod n under an arbitrary enumeration of V .
• From state (r0, v), the game proceeds along the path (r0, v) → (r1, v) → . . . (r2n+3, v) regardless
of the actions. Note that since (r2n+3, v) ∈ Fv \
⋃
v′ 6=v Fv′ , then only Player v incurs a finite cost,
and this cost is at least 2n+ 3.
We now claim that the game has an NE iff there exists a Hamiltonian path in G from s. For
the first direction, assume there exists a Hamiltonian path s1, s2, . . . , sn in G with s = s1. Con-
sider strategies for the players whose outcome is the path. That is, the vertices along the outcome
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are q0, s1, (s1, s2), s2, (s2, s3), . . . (sn−1, sn), sn. The length of this path is 2n, and since this is a Hamilto-
nian path, each vertex is visited along it. So the cost for every player is at most 2n. It is easy to observe
that any deviation for any player would give cost of at least 2n+ 1 to that player, so this is an NE.
Conversely, consider an NE in the game. We claim that its outcome must describe a Hamiltonian
path in G. First, notice that any outcome starting with a transition from q0 to q1 cannot be an NE,
since Player s ∈ V can always deviate and cause the play to reach s after one step, thus getting cost 1.
Second, the outcome cannot proceed to vertex (r0, v) for any Player v - indeed, this causes all other
players to incur cost∞, in which case any one of them can deviate at q0 and take the outcome to q2n+1.
Thus, the outcome must induce a path in G. Next, observe that all vertices must be visited along
this path, as otherwise a player whose corresponding vertex is not visited (and hence incurs cost ∞)
can deviate at q0 to take the outcome to q2n+1. Finally, we claim that all vertices are visited within the
first n vertices (i.e. within the first 2n transitions). Indeed - if vertex v is visited after more than 2n
transitions, then since every transition within V includes an “edge step”, the cost of Player v is at least
2n+ 2, in which case Player v can deviate at q0 to take the outcome to q2n+1.
We conclude that the outcome of an NE induces a Hamiltonian path from s in G.
6 Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy
Decentralized decision-making, in the form of concurrency, may lead to sub-optimal solutions from the
point of view of society as a whole. This sub-optimality can be quantified by the concepts of price of
stability (PoS) and price of anarchy (PoA) [5], which we study in this section.
For a cost vector ~c = (cα)α∈Ω, we define the social utility util(~c) =
∑
α∈Ω cα to be the sum of the
costs. We then define for a game G the social optimum SO(G) = minP∈SΩ util(cost(P )) as the minimal
possible social utility that can be attained in G. We assume w.l.o.g. SO(G) ≥ 1. This can be achieved
by enforcing an initial transition with cost 1 for all players.
Intuitively, the social optimum captures the value in case of a centralized authority. Let Υ denote the
set of NE cost vectors in G, we then define PoS(G) = min~c∈Υ util(c)SO(G) and PoA(G) = sup~c∈Υutil(c)SO(G) . Intuitively,
PoS(G) measures how much society losses from the lack of a centralized authority, under the assumptions
that player will collaborate in a suggested NE (hence taking the “best”, or minimal, NE). PoA(G) does
not assume any collaboration, and so takes into account the “worst” NE. Clearly 1 ≤ PoS(G) ≤ PoA(G),
and the closer these values are to 1, the more “stable” the game is.
As the following example shows, concurrent games with costs are not stable: PoS(G) may be expo-
nentially large, and PoA(G) may be infinite (even in games where NE exist). Corollary 8 in Section 3
implies that this bound is tight – PoS(G) cannot be bigger than exponential.
Example 15 Consider the 2-player game G in Figure 4, which proceeds as follows. The actions are
{0, 1} for both players. At state s0, if both players choose 0, the game proceeds to state s1, where a XOR
game is played to reach s2 with cost either (0, 1) or (1, 0), and s2 is a target for both players.
s4 s3 s0 s1 s2
(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 0)
(W,W )(0, 0)
(W,W )
Figure 4: A game with exponential PoS and infinite PoA.
If any player plays 1 at s0, a cost of (W,W ) is incurred, for some number W described in binary,
and the game proceeds to state s3. At state s3, if both player play 0, the game proceeds to s4, which is a
target for both player. Otherwise, the game stays at s3, and incurs another (W,W ) cost.
It is not hard to see that SO(G) = 1, by selecting some branch to s2. However, the best NE is induced
by the outcome s0, s3, s4, which incurs cost (W,W ), and there are arbitrarily bad NEs attained by both
players playing 1 in state s3. Thus, PoS(G) = 2W and PoA(G) =∞.
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Related Work
After preparing this paper, we discovered that the results overlap with [14]. Our contribution differs by
giving a polynomial-time algorithm for computing Pareto Optimal NE in certain fragments (Section 4.2),
by giving refined hardness bounds (Section 5), and by studying the Price of Stability and Price of
Anarchy (Section 6).
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